We study the stability properties of organizations in partition function games, describing cooperative situations with externalities. An organization is defined as a group of agents, together with a set of bilateral relations, formally, a connected graph. Because of the presence of externalities, the profitability of coalitional threats to an organization depend on the reaction of non coalitional members. This reaction is likely to depend on the links that non coalitional members maintain in the organization. We show that this directly implies that minimally connected organizations emerge under positive externalities, while the fully connected organization emerges under negative. This result is shown to hold independently of the adopted payoff imputation rule. Sharper predictions are possible for the specific case of the egalitarian rule. Here, if only coalitions that are connected in the organization can effectively object to it, the star organization prevails under positive externalities, and the wheel, a non fully connected organization, prevails under negative.
Introduction
In various economic problems, agents face incentives to form groups and coalitions. The classical game theoretic analysis of cooperation has mainly addressed the problem of how to split the efficiency gains among coalitional members, proposing solutions based on various fairness or stability considerations. More recently, new models of coalition formation have focused on the prediction of the equilibrium configuration of groups, formally summarized by a coalition structure (a partition of the set of players into disjoint coalitions). 1 These models have proved useful in the analysis of economic problems in which the formation of multiple coalitions is observed, and in which the payoff possibilities of a coalition depend on the configuration of other groups in the system. Among the various contribution to this field of research 2 , a series of results by Yi (1997 Yi ( , 2000 have related the properties of equilibrium coalition structures to the sign of such external effects. Yi shows that the two classes of positive and negative externalities 3 provide a useful organizing principle in studying economic problems in which coalitions are a relevant feature.
Coalition structures do not contain information on how coalitional members achieve the necessary degree of coordination in order to act as a group. As first suggested in the seminal paper by Myerson (1977) , a richer representation of the cooperative framework would be provided by a graph (or, in Myerson's terminology, cooperation structure), specifying all bilateral connections between players in the system. By considering the equivalence classes of the connectivity relation 4 (given by the components of the graph), a partition of the set of 1 Although the possibility of multiple coalitions was already implicit in the analysis of stable sets by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and of bargaining set by Aumann and Maschler (1964) , and explicit in the work by Aumann and Dreze (1974) , the focus of these work was not the analysis of which groups endogenously form in the system.
2 See Hart and Kurz (1983), Bloch (1996) , Vohra (1997, 1999) , Yi (1997) . For two extensive surveys of this approach, see Bloch (1997) and Yi (2000) . 3 The sign of the externalities refers to the welfare effect exerted on non coalitional members by the formation of a coalition. Positive externalities attain to cases in which this effect is positive (as in public good games or Cournot oligopolies), while negative extenalities attain to negative welfare effects (as in trade areas).
Some authors use the term "splillovers" to distinguish betwenn the gains from cooperation, occurring within a coalition, from the welfare effect across coalitions (see Bloch (1996) and Konishi, Weber and Le Breton (1997)). 4 Two players are connected in a graph if there exists a path in the graph of which these players are endpoints (see section 2 for formal definitions).
2 players is obtained, that can be interpreted as the coalition structure induced by the graph. 5 The additional information provided by the architecture of each component can be viewed as a description of the internal organization of coalitions, possibly describing the pattern of bilateral communication and negotiations (as in Myerson (1977) and Aumann and Myerson (1988) ), of information processing (as in Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) ) or of decision making (as in Demange (2001)).
This paper studies the endogenous formation of cooperation structures in the presence of externalities across groups. We adopt a partition function as primitive, specifying the worth of a coalition as a function of the coalition structure to which it belongs. Differently from Myerson (1977) and all the following literature on network formation 6 , we therefore allow the value produced by each component of a graph to depend on the partition induced by the set of components; we, however, do not allow this value to depend on the architecture of components, taking, in this sense, a step back with respect to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) .
For a discussion of these differences, we refer to the final part of this introduction.
We focus on connected graphs, henceforth organizations, identifying coalitions with specific internal structures in terms of bilateral relation between members. In the same spirit of Yi's (1999) work on coalition structure, we wish to study the structural characteristics of organizations under positive and negative externalities. While Yi's analysis looked at the external configuration of groups (coalition structures), ours focuses on groups' internal organization. Our results show that structural features of an organization, such as its degree of connectedness, of hierarchy and, in some cases, its entire architecture, can be related to the sign of the externality faced by its members. In particular, we show that positive externalities favor the formation of cohesive and hierarchical organizations, while negative externalities favor dispersed and horizontal ones.
Our approach is coalitional in spirit. We define stability of an organization taking as primitive the threat of members to separate from the organization and take independent action. The strategic possibilities of coalitions are therefore weaker than in the strong stability concept used in Jackson and van den Nouweland (2001) (and, equivalently, in the strong Nash equilibrium concept used in Dutta et al. (1998) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) ), in that
we "force" all members of an objecting coalition to sever all links with the other players 5 Underlying this approach is the idea that a coalition arises when all members are pairwise connected. 6 See, however, the paper by Mutuswami and Winter (2000) on the design of incentives in networks with, possibly, externalities.across components.
in the organization. This approach is, however, equivalent to that of Jackson and van den Nouweland (2001) under the component wise egalitarian imputation rule, to which part of our results refer. 7 Our analysis builds on a basic observation, underlying the equilibrium analysis of coalition structures with externalities. As a result of the externalities, the incentives of coalitional members to defect from a coalition and take independent action depend on the consequences of their defection on the configuration of the "residual" players, that is, those coalitional members which are not active in the defection. If these remain compact, defectors will face high incentives under positive externalities (as, for instance, free riders in public goods problems) and low incentives under negative externalities (as, for instance, countries leaving a trade area). If, in contrast, the residual players split up into singletons, defectors will face low incentives under positive externalities, and high incentives under negative.
The attempt to specify reasonable reactions of residual players has motivated a variety of approaches to the analysis of stable coalition structures, building these reactions in the model by means of behavioral assumptions 8 . In this respect, one important element of the present analysis is that the additional information provided by organizations on the structure of cooperation can be used to formulate clear-cut predictions on such reactions. In fact, these are likely to depend on the links maintained by residual players in the organization. This is certainly an appropriate assumption if links are to express long term relationships, such as trust or institutional relations; in this case, maintaining (or re-establishing) such links after the organization is disrupted should be easier for players who were linked in the organization.
An interpretation of defections as deviations in a strategic form game of link formation, as in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) , would predict that these links remain unchanged after the defection. In this case, by determining well defined "reactions" of non coalitional members, each organization would provide well defined incentives to any objecting coalition. More importantly, these incentives would depend in a clear-cut way on the sign of the external effects: positive externalities will reward objections that leave the residual part of the group 7 The component wise egualitarian rule has been shown by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2001) to play a crucial role for the existence of strong Nash equilibria. 8 The ∆ and Γ games of coalition formation by Hart and Kurz (1983) , or, equivalently, the membership rules employed in Yi (1997) , are examples of such behavioural assumptions. Other approaches have "endogenized" the reaction of residual players, either by considering a sequential structure (Bloch (1996) , Ray and Vohra (1999)), or by imposing consistency requirements (Ray and Vohra (1997) and, more recently, Xue et al. connected, and penalize objections that disintegrate the group, while opposite arguments apply to the case of negative externalities.
As an illustration, consider a star organization, with one central players maintaining all the links. The profitability of individual objections crucially depends on the player's position in the organization, according to the sign of the externality. If this sign is positive, the objection is less profitable if raised by a central player than by a peripheral player, for in the first case the rest of the players react by disintegrating the group, neutralizing the incentives to free-ride. The opposite is true under positive externalities, where leaving the organization from a peripheral position would make the departing player face a compact group after the objection.
The theoretical problem we address is whether it is possible to associate with each sign of the externalities a class of organizations, providing "minimal" incentives to all coalitions who have the "ability" to object. This ability may be unrelated to the organizational structure, as in the case of the strong stability concept of Jackson and van den Nouweland (2001), or may be determined by the links maintained by players, as in Weber (1986, 1993 ) and Demange (2001) . We will consider both cases, assuming, in the second case, that only coalitions that are connected in an organization may object to it. 9 We obtain the following results.
First, the class of minimally connected organizations minimizes the incentives to object of all possible coalitions under positive externalities, while the same is true for the complete organization (i.e., the maximally connected one) under negative externalities. This holds independently of the adopted imputation rule, and implies that if all coalitions have the ability to object, then minimally (resp., maximally) connected stable organizations always exist under positive (resp., negative) externalities, provided the set of stable organization is nonempty; moreover, partition functions can be found for which organizations belonging to these two classes are the unique stable ones.
Second, the restriction of the objecting power to connected coalitions allows for sharper predictions of stable egalitarian organizations. 10 Under positive externalities, minimal incentives to object are provided by the star organization, confirming (and qualifying) the previous 9 This approach, taken in the papers by Weber (1986, 1993) and by Demange (2001) , is appropriate for cases in which links express relations that are not alterable (or, at least, established) at the time objections are raised. We think, for instance, of relations based on trust or on insitutional arrangements. 10 We here mean organizations adopting an egualitarian imputation rule.
prediction of minimal connections. Under negative externalities, a non complete organization -the wheel -turns out to possess equivalent stability properties to the complete one. The emergence of a non maximally connected architecture under negative externalities can be best understood by noting that adding links to a given organization has, in this case, two opposite effects on stability. First, a more connected structure decreases the incentives to object of each coalition, by inducing a more concentrated partition on residual players. This effect was at the basis of the prediction of the complete organization when all coalitions may raise objections. Second, additional links enlarge the set of connected coalitions (here, the only ones able to object). The resulting trade off has the wheel organization as an equilibrium point.
Related Literature
Our analysis contributes to two distinct by closely related literatures, whose object is the study of the formation of coalition structures and of networks. With respect to the recent and growing literature on network formation, the present analysis is a first step towards a characterization of equilibrium networks in the presence of externalities across components. This is a new element in the theory, traditionally based on primitives that do not allow for a treatment of such external effects. 11 Our contribution is, however, not directly comparable with the recent developments in the literature on network formation, for two main limitations present in our analysis. First, our approach neglects all efficiency issues related to the architecture of connected graphs, a limitation common to all the literature prior to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . This limitation may be interpreted as a restriction of the cooperative problems covered by our analysis, ruling out important features of network formation such as costs in establishing and maintaining links or congestion in connections; alternatively, we may view the present approach as a way of isolating the effect of different signs of the externality on the organizational structure of groups, that would, in a more general framework, be endogenously determined also by efficiency considerations.
The second limitation implicit in our approach is related to the employed stability concept, ruling out the possibility of players to alter the existing organizational structure in order to The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces graph theoretic concepts and definitions, and presents the employed concepts of stability. Section 3 contains our main results. Section 4 concludes the paper and discusses directions for further research.
Concepts and Notation
This section introduces the main tools of analysis of the paper. We first define a graph, describing the set of all bilateral relationships established by agents in the system. We then discuss how a graph identifies equivalence classes of players that can be interpreted as groups, each characterized by a specific internal organization. We then describe how value is produced in the system as a function of the groups that are formed, and how this value in imputed to individual agents. Finally, we define the stability concepts that will be used in the analysis of section 4.
Graphs
We consider a set of players N = {1, 2, ..i, .., n}. Players can communicate by means of bilateral relations, or "links"; we denote a link between i and j by ij. A simple non directed graph g = (N (g) , L (g)) describes the set of links between pairs of players in the set N(g) (vertex set). When possible, we will use the notation ij ∈ g = (N(g), L(g)) meaning that {ij} ∈ N(g) and ij ∈ L(g). We denote by G S the set of all possible graphs with vertex set S, for all S ⊆ N. When the set of vertices is left unspecified, it is understood to be N. Given
we also denote by L S (g) the set of those links in L that have at least one endpoint in the set of vertices S:
We say that the graph
we use the notation g 0 ⊆ g for the specific case in which g 0 is a subgraph of g and N(g 0 ) = N(g). Particular subgraphs of g ∈ G N are the graph g\S = (N\S, L\L S (g)) obtained by deleting the set of vertices S from g, and the graph (g − S) = (N, L\L g (S)) obtained by deleting all links incident to players in S. Note that g\S has (n−s)
vertices, while (g − S) has n vertices.
We say that two graphs g and g 0 are homeomorphic if we can obtain g from g 0 by relabelling the vertices of g and accordingly changing its links. We will refer to an "architecture" as to an homeomorphism class of graphs.
Connectedness and Organizations
In this paper we are primarily interested in how graphs identify the set of organizations that emerge in the system. In order to do it, we need to introduce the concept of connectedness.
The set of vertices
a walk and is said to connect vertices i 1 and i m in g.
then W is a path if i 1 6 = j m , and W is a cycle if
The graph g is connected if for each pair of vertices in N (g) there is a connecting path.
For short, we refer to the connected graph g as an organization, made of a group of agents N(g) and of an organizational structure given by the set L(g). We say that the subset of vertices S ⊂ N (g) is connected in g if for each pair of vertices in S there is a connecting path in g. We denote by S c (g) the set of subsets of vertices of g that are connected in g.
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A component h of the graph g is a maximal connected subgraph of g. 12 We denote by C(g) the set of components of g. The components of g are the equivalence classes of the connectedness relation induced by g on N. We can therefore use the set C(g) to associate
with each graph g a unique partition π(g) of the set of players N (g):
Note that the graph g induces a unique collection of organizations. Also, for each possible coalitions structure π on N there exist many graphs g such that π (g) = π, and that all connected graphs g yield π(g) = {N}. All connected graphs are therefore representative of situations in which the grand coalition forms, although each of them specifies a different organizational structure. Three specific connected architectures will be studied.
Definition 1
The star architecture has one central vertex c, linked to all other n−1 vertices, and no other link.
Definition 2
The wheel architecture has n links and a unique cycle going through all vertices.
Definition 3 The complete architecture has all links between all pairs all vertices
We will denote by g s , g w and g N graphs with the star, wheel and complete architectures, respectively. star wheel complete The following definition refer to the consequences of the deletion of subsets of vertices from a graph, and will extensively used in the stability analysis of sections 3 and 4.
12 A connected subgraph h is maximal if no other connected subgraph h 0 exists that contains h.
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Definition 4 The set of vertices S is a vertex-cut for graph g if g\S has more components than g. If S = {i} is a vertex cut we say that i is a cut-vertex.
Values
The aggregate welfare produced in the system depends on the pattern of communication established by agents. We assume that aggregate welfare only depends on the coalition structure π (g) and not by the whole architecture of the graph g. Values are given by a partition function v mapping each coalition structure π = {B 1 , B 2 , ..., B m } for N into a vector
Behind the use of a partition function lies the implicit assumption that it is possible to determine the payoff produced by each group within each possible coalition structure. One way to justify this assumption is to interpret the values of v(π) as the equilibrium payoff of some normal form game played by the elements of π if π forms 13 . We denote by V the set of all partition functions.
Since the payoff of a coalition may depend on the whole coalition structure to which that coalition belongs, partition functions allow for the presence of externalities. Externalities are
The following definitions classify externalities in two classes.
Definition 5
The partition π is a concentration of π 0 if it is possible to originate π from π 0 by successively moving single players from smaller to bigger coalitions. We say that π is a strict concentration of π 0 if π is a concentration of π 0 and π 6 = π 0 . 14
whenever π\S is a concentration of π 0 \S, with strict inequality if π\S is a strict concentration of π 0 \S.
whenever π 0 \S is a concentration of π\S, with strict inequality if π\S is a strict concentration of π 0 \S. 13 This interpretation was first suggested by Ichiischi (1980) , and then extensively adopted in the coalition formation literature.
14 Note that the concentration relation does not induce a complete ordering on partitions (see Yi (2000) ).
We denote by V + and V − the sets of all partition functions exhibiting positive and negative externalities, respectively.
Imputations
To complete our presentation of the model, we introduce an imputation rule Y , mapping pairs (g, v) into vectors in R n . An imputation rule ex-ante specifies how the aggregate value produced by a graph is distributed among players.
Throughout the paper we will only consider rules that satisfy the following two properties.
Definition 8
The imputation rule Y is component balanced (CB) if ∀g, ∀v, ∀S ∈ π (g) :
Component balance, first defined in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , imposes that no value be transferred across components, so that the aggregate payoff imputed to each organization is determined by the partition function v only.
The second property we assume is anonymity (AN), basically requiring that the names of the players do not matter for their payoff imputation, which depends only on their position in the architecture (we refer to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for a formal definition).
The simplest anonymous and component balanced imputation rule is obtained by equally sharing the value of each component among its vertices.
Definition 9
The Component Wise Egalitarian Imputation Rule (CWE) Y ce shares the value of each component equally among its vertices. Formally, for all i ∈ h and all h ∈ C(g) :
Stability Concepts
In order to be a predictable outcome, an organization should have the property of not providing its members with incentives to rearrange their own links. This approach has lead to the concepts of pairwise stable graphs in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , where only pairs and individual players can raise objections, and of strongly stable graphs in Dutta and Mutuswuami (1997) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2001), where any coalition can form and object to a graph. 15 A common feature of these concepts is that in case of objection by a coalition S to a graph g, players in N\S maintain all their current links unchanged and do not attempt to form new ones. This assumption is indeed consistent with an interpretation of coalitional objections to graph g as coordinated deviations from some strategy profile for N inducing g in a normal form game of link formation. Strongly Stable graphs can be therefore viewed as Strong Nash Equilibria or the link formation game. In this paper we maintain this approach, and study alternative stability concepts, that differ with respect to the strategic possibilities available to objecting coalitions. 16 We define these concept for general (that is, connected as well as disconnected) graphs, although our analysis will focus on organizations, defined as connected graphs.
If all coalitions can form and revise their links in any desired way, the strong stability concept of Jackson and van den Nouweland obtains.
Definition 10
The graph g 0 is obtainable from the graph g by coalition S if
2. ij ∈ g and ij / ∈ g 0 ⇒ {i, j} ∩ S 6 = ∅.
Definition 11
The graph g is strongly stable with respect to (Y, v) if there exists no S ⊆ N and no graph g 0 such that:
1. g 0 is obtainable from the graph g by coalition S;
If objecting coalitions face the simpler binary choice of whether to stay within a group or to leave it (a natural assumption in the coalition formation literature), a weaker stability concept results.
Definition 12
The graph g 0 is stand alone obtainable from the graph g by coalition S if g 0 = g\S ∪ g 00 for some g 00 = (S, L).
Definition 13
The graph g is stand-alone stable with respect to (Y, v) if there exists no S ⊂ N and graph g 0 such that:
1. g 0 is stand-alone obtainable from the graph g by S;
Note that in both concepts defined above, the possibility of players to get organized in given at the time of the objection, the formation of disconnected coalitions should be ruled out. 17 
Definition 14
The graph g is c-stable with respect to (Y, v) if there exists no S ⊆ N such that S is connected in g and no graph g 0 obtainable by S from g such that:
Results
This section studies stable organizations. We first present a set of results on stand alone stability, that do not rely on any specific assumption on the imputation rule other than component balance and anonymity. We then study the structure of strongly stable and c-stable organizations for the specific case of the Component Wise Egalitarian Rule.
Stand Alone Stable Organizations
Under stand alone stability, coalitional objections have a simple structure, with objectors seceding from the organization, and the rest of the players (hereafter denoted "residual") maintaining their current links. It follows that if two organizations are ordered by inclusion, the same inclusion order will hold (weakly) on the graphs induced by coalitional objections on residual players. This is illustrated by Figure 2 for a 5 vertex graph g and a graph g 0 , obtained by adding the link 45 to g. Objections raised by any coalition S including either vertices 4 or 5 (or both) induce the same graph on N\S from both organizations; formally,
Objections raised by any coalition S 0 that does not include 4 nor 5 leads to a more connected structure if raised against g 0 than if raised against g; formally, g 0 \S ⊂ g\S (see Figure 2 ). If externalities are positive, such objections will be more profitable when raised against the organizational g 0 than if raised against g. If externalities are negative, the opposite will hold. The above results imply the following facts:
1) for each minimally connected organization g there exists a function v g ∈ V + for which g is stable with respect to v g but no organization including g is;
2) there exists a function v ∈ V − for which the complete organization is stable with respect to v and such that all non complete organizations are not.
These result abstract from all efficiency issues related to the organizational structure 18 .
Accounting for such issues would provide agents with additional, and possibly opposite, incentive to delete and sever links. These additional incentive may well lead to different organizations from those predicted here. Nevertheless, our results highlight a clear-cut effect of the sign of the externality faced by coalitional members on the structure of the adopted organization. In particular, positive externalities favor the stability of groups with a low degree of cohesion, while negative favor the formation of more intense relationships and more cohesive groups.
Egalitarian Strongly Stable Organizations
The results of propositions 1 and 2 do not in general extend to the strong stability concept, as the following example shows.
Example 1 Let g ⊂ g 0 be as in Figure 2 . Consider the graphs that player 1 can obtain from graphs g and g 0 by deleting his links with players 2 and 3. If
player 1 has more incentives to raise this particular objection to the graph g than g 0 , although g ⊂ g 0 . Note that since player 1 is central with respect to 4 and 5 in the three-vertex star graph g\ {2, 3}, while he is symmetric to these players in Y 1 (g 0 \ {2, 3}), the assumption that 18 Such issues are considered by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , and by almost all the following literature.
is not unreasonable (it is indeed consistent with the axiom of the
Myerson rule). The argument follows by noting that if
then g is not strongly stable even if g 0 is.
The failure of proposition 1 in example 1 is related to the role of the imputation rule Y .
Given Y , player 1 has an incentive to separate from players 2 and 3, forcing players 4 and 5 to remain connected with him and to end up worse off. This opportunity arises as a consequence of the additional links from g to g 0 , invalidating proposition 1. A crucial property of Y in this example is that player 1 is imputed a higher payoff than 2 and 3 after the objection to g. If Y assigned an equal payoff to these three players before and after player 1's objection, the incentives of these three players would be aligned, replicating the incentives of coalition 
.
Remark 1
The results of propositions 1 and 2 extend to the strong stability concept when the adopted imputation rule is the CWE.
The next propositions shows, however, that the extreme symmetry introduced by the adoption of the CWE rule leads to the result that the internal organization of a group is immaterial for its strong stability under positive externalities. We can rephrase the above result by saying that under the CWE rule, the internal organization of a group cannot be determined on the sole basis of the effect of positive externalities on the profitability of objections. Note that this also applies to graphs which are ordered by inclusion, such as g and g 0 in Figure 2 . Here, although coalition N\ {4, 5} has more incentives to deviate against g 0 than against g, still we can find a 3 player coalition that would face equivalently high incentives when deviating from g (in this case, such coalition may be {2, 3, 4}). Since all 3 players coalition get the same payoff in both graphs, it follows that if g is strongly stable, so is g 0 , despite the fact that the latter provides more incentives to object to some of the possible coalitions.
We finally remark how, by
Step 2 in the proof of proposition 3 (showing that for all possible coalitional sizes, there is at least one coalition that would, by objecting, leave the group compact), the conditions for the strong stability of any arbitrary organization are the same as those required for the grandcoalition to be a strong Nash equilibrium of the ∆ game by Hart and Kurz (1983).
Egalitarian C-stable Organizations
The indeterminacy result of proposition 3 was driven by the extreme symmetry induced by the adoption of an egalitarian imputation rule, jointly with the assumption of unconstrained coalition formation intrinsic in the strong stability concept. This section shows that once this symmetry is broken by limiting the objecting power to connected coalitions, the indeterminacy disappears 19 and two specific architectures -the star under positive externalities and the wheel under negative -minimize the incentives to object of all admissable coalitions.
The Star Organization
We remind the definition of the star architecture.
Definition 15
We first discuss the structural properties of the star architecture, on which our results are based. Note first that the set of coalitions that are connected in a star architecture only contains either single vertices or subsets of vertices that include the central vertex. Thus, all non trivial coalitional objections to a star organization induce non coalitional members to split up and remain singletons. This reaction is the least profitable for objectors under positive externalities, and the most profitable under negative. Objection by individual members, in 19 Technically, the property proved in Step 2 of proposition 3 does not hold if only connected coalitions are considered. In the star graph, for instance, there is no connected set of two or more vertices that, if removed, leave all the other vertices connected.
contrast, induce, if raised by peripheral players, a connected graph on the other players -the most profitable situation under positive externalities. In this case, however, a simple graph theoretic fact, stating that every graph has at least two non cut vertices (see the footnote to the proof of proposition 1), implies that such deviations cannot be more profitable than those raised by a non cut vertex to any arbitrary organization. These arguments are used to develop the following propositions, whose detailed proofs are given in the appendix. We obtain the following corollary. 
The Wheel Organization
We remind the definition of the wheel architecture.
Definition 16
The wheel architecture has n links and there is a unique cycle going through all vertices.
We first show, in the next lemma, that the wheel and the complete architectures share equivalent c-stability properties, independently of the sign of the externalities. As for the case of the star, the set of connected coalitions in the wheel architecture possesses special properties: each coalition S connected in g w induces a connected subgraph g w \S. Therefore, the coalition structure π (g w \S) is a concentration of every other coalition structures on the set N\S k . Negative externalities directly imply that all (connected) coalitional objection to g w are (weakly) less profitable than they would be, if raised against any other organization (with the sole exception of the complete one). These arguments lead to the next propositions (see appendix for a detailed proof.). We obtain the following corollary. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the possibility that the presence of welfare externalities across groups can be among the determinants of their internal organization. Referring to the classes of "positive" and "negative" externalities, we look at the organizations that minimize the incentives of their members to raise objections under either sign of the external effect. We find that, abstracting from the well known efficiency issues related to the choice of an organization, positive externalities favor the adoption of dispersed organizations, characterized by few connections between their members, while negative externalities favor the formation of more cohesive structures. We also show that if connectedness is needed in order to object to a group, then two specific organizations -the star and the wheel -prevail under positive and negative externalities, respectively. These structures have opposite hierarchical natures, 
Since g is stand alone stable w.r.t. (Y, v), for all S ⊂ N and all graphs g S ∈ G S we have:
Consider now the graph g\S ∈ G N\S . Since g 0 ⊂ g we also have g 0 \S ⊆ g\S. Therefore, positive externalities of v imply:
Equations (2) and (3) Proof. The "only if" part is trivial. We prove the "if" part for the strong stability concept.
We first show that if a connected graph g is not strongly stable, then there is an objection that disconnects the objecting coalition from the graph g. Since g is not strongly stable w.r.t.
(Y ce , v), there exists a coalition S and a graph g 0 such that g 0 is obtainable from g by S and such that all players in S are better off at g 0 than at g according to (Y ce , v). Letting the collection of components {h 1 , ..., h m } denote those elements of C(g 0 ) containing members of S, we have that for all j = 1, 2, ..., m,
To show that this implies that coalition T = ∪ m j=1 N(h j ), with S ⊂ T , also improves upon the graph g, note that if g 0 is obtainable by S from g, then it is obtainable from g by any coalition T such that S ⊂ T , by replicating the links severed and added by players in S from g to g 0 and leaving the links involving players in T \S at g unchanged in g 0 .
We finally prove the "if" part for the c-stability concept. If g is not c-stable, then consider coalition S, graph g 0 and components {h 1 , ..., h m } as above, with condition (4). We note that since S was connected, then there exists a walk going through at least one vertex in each of the components in {h 1 , ..., h m }. But since components are themselves connected graphs, then the coalition T = ∪ m j=1 N(h j ) is connected, which concludes the final part of the proof. Proof. We proceed in 3 steps.
Step 1. By connectedness of g and g 0 ,
is strongly stable w.r.t. (Y ce , v), then by lemma 1 we can write:
Suppose that g 0 is connected and is not strongly stable w.r.t. (Y ce , v). In this case there exists some T such that
To show that (5) contradicts (6) we need to prove a fact on connectedness of graphs in Step 2.
Step 2. If g is connected, then for all k = 1, 2, ..., n we can find a set of vertices S of size k such that g\S is connected.
We proceed by induction on k. For k = 1, let i be the endpoint of a maximal path in g (there must always exists such a path since g is connected). Since it is an endpoint, then all the vertices adjacent to i must belong to that path, which is still connected in g\i. It follows that the graph g\i is connected as long as g was connected. Suppose now that the hypothesis is true for k = m. Then there exists a set S of size m such that g\S is connected. We now apply again the result of the first part of the proof to say that there exists some i ∈ N\S which is not a cut vertex for g\S. Consider then the coalition S ∪ i. This coalition is of size m + 1, and, by the fact that (g\S) \i is connected, we conclude that g\(S ∪ i) is connected, which proves the result.
Step 3. We use step 2 to conclude that there exists some coalition T of size t such that g\T is connected. By positive externalities, this implies
Inequalities (5) and (7), together with the properties of the imputation rule Y ce , contradict condition (6). (Y ce , v g ), g is not.
Proof. We first show in step 1 that if there exists a connected graph g which is c-stable w.r.t. (Y ce , v), then g s is also c-stable w.r.t. (Y ce , v). Steps 2 and 3 prove the second part of the proposition.
Step 1. Let g be a connected c-stable graph w.r.t. (Y ce , v) . For all i ∈ N :
Since there must exist at least two vertices in g which are not cut-vertices for g, 20 then (8) and the assumption that g is connected imply that for all i ∈ N :
We conclude that individual deviations by i 6 = c cannot be profitable in g s . By positive externalities, this also implies that individual deviations by c from g s , inducing the empty graph on the set of vertices N\ {c}, cannot be profitable.
Consider now coalition S of size s ≥ 2, and assume it is connected in g. Since g is c-stable
For any connected coalition S 0 of equal size s in g s (we know there must be at least one and it must include c), the partition π (g\S) is a concentration of π (g s \S 0 ) = ∅ N\S 0 , so that, using (10) and positive externalities, we obtain:
To prove that c-stability of g implies c-stability of g s , it suffices to show that for each connected coalition in g s there exists a connected coalition in g of equal size. Since g is connected there must be a non cut vertex i in g such that g\i is a connected graph of size n − 1 (see footnote 12). By the same argument, there must be some non cut-vertex j in g\i, so that g\ (i ∪ j) is a connected graph of size n − 2. And so on until size 1. So, connectedness of g implies that for each size k = 1, 2, ..., n, there exists a coalition S k of size k that is connected in g.
Step 2. Let g 6 = g s . Let v g be such that g s is c-stable w.r.t. (Y ce , v g ) and satisfy the
for some set of vertices T of size t ≥ 2 which is connected in g s . Suppose first that we can always choose T such that g\T 6 = ∅ (this fact is proved in step 3). Note also that g s \T = ∅ for some labelling of the set of vertices N. Positive externalities and the fact that π (g\T ) is a concentration of π (g s \T ) = ∅ imply:
which shows that g is not c-stable with respect to (Y ce , v g ).
Step 3.For every connected graph g 6 = g s there exists some connected coalition T of size bigger than one such that g\T 6 = ∅.
If g 6 = g s and g is connected then there exist two vertices i, j both with two incident links, that is there exist h, k and l, m such that {ih, ik, jl, jm} ⊂ g. Now suppose that ij / ∈ g. Since g is connected, there exists a walk going from j to either h or k or both, and this walk does not go through i. Therefore, deleting either ik or ih, respectively, leaves this walk connected, which proves the result for coalition T being either {i, k} or {ih}, respectively. Suppose now that ij ∈ g. In this case, we can distinguish between two cases: either j ∈ {h, k} or j / ∈ {h, k}.
In the first case, suppose j = h: then, if jk ∈ g we obtain a cycle with vertices i, j, k, so that the result would proved for coalition {ik}. If jk / ∈ g, then there must be some l such that jl ∈ g. In this case, the result is proved for coalition {ik}, since jl ∈ g\ {ik}. Proof. We prove the two parts of the proposition in separate steps.
Step 1. Letπ denote the singletons coalition structure. If g s is c-stable, then
By negative externalities, for all g and i ∈ N:
It follows that no player can profitably deviate from g.
Turning to coalitional deviations, note that for all k = 1, 2, ..., n−1 we can find a connected set of vertices S k of size k such that g s \S k = ∅ N\S k ; if g s is c-stable w.r.t. (Y ce , v), then for each such coalition S k of size k and for all partitions π S of S k :
Note finally that, by negative externalities, if S k has size k then, for all π S and π N\S , X
so that S k cannot improve upon graph g for all k = 1, 2, ..., n − 1.
Step 2. Let g 6 = g s . By step 3 in proposition 4, there exists a connected coalition T such that g\T 6 = ∅. Let v g ∈ V − be such that for all set of vertices T connected in g:
Consider g s and let its central player c belong to T . By negative externalities:
which proves that g s is not c-stable w.r.t. (Y ce , v g ). 
Note now that is S is a set of connected vertices in g w then the graph g N \S is connected.
This implies that inequality (20) applies to such sets and g w is c-stable. Proof. We prove the first part of the proposition in step 1, and the second in steps 2 and 3.
Step If g is connected, then for all k = 1, 2, ..., n there exists a connected coalition S k in g of size k. 21 Since g is stable w.r.t. (Y ce , v) then for all k = 1, 2, ..., n, and any of the associated sets S k connected in g, we have:
Consider now a wheel organization g w . For all sets of vertices T k connected in g w the graph g w \T k is connected. By negative externalities this implies that if T k is of size k, then
Inequalities (21) and (22) imply that g w is c-stable.
Step 2. Consider now a non complete organization g 6 = g w , and suppose that g w is stable w.r.t. (Y ce , v g ) for some v g ∈ V − . Suppose first that we can find a set of vertices S which is connected in g and such that g\S is not connected. In this case, we construct v g in order to satisfy the additional constraint:
By negative externalities:
which implies that S can object to g and that g is not c-stable. We therefore just need to show that such a set S can be found. We do this in step 3.
Step 3. For every connected but non complete graph g 6 = g w there is a set of vertices S which is connected in g and such that g\S is not connected. Consider then a connected but non complete graph g such that g w ⊂ g. Let ij / ∈ g, and let P 1 and P 2 denote the two paths connecting i and j in g w . Note that both P 1 and P 2 are connected in g, P 1 ∩ P 2 = {i, j} and that
If the set of vertices N\ {i, j} is connected in g, then this set can be used to prove the result noting that g\ (N\ {i, j}) = ∅.
If N\ {i, j} is disconnected in g, then the assumption that g w ⊂ g implies that there exist k, l in either P 1 or P 2 such that kl ∈ g\g w . Suppose, w.l.g., that {k, l} ⊂ P 1 , and let, again w.l.g., k be closer 22 to i than l in P 1 . Consider now the path P that coincides with P 1 between i and k and then include the link kl and coincides again with P 1 after l until j. 23 Note that P ⊂ P 1 and that P \P 1 is nonempty, since the vertices k and l are not consecutive in P 1 , so that there exist some vertex m ∈ P 1 which comes after k and before l in P 1 and that is not in P . This implies that the set of vertices P separates the sets of vertices P 1 \P from the set N\NP 1 , proving the result. (Y ce , v g ), the wheel organization is not.
Proof. We proceed in two separate steps, proving the first and second parts of the proposition, respectively.
Step 1. The argument is easier for the complete organization g N , and by lemma 1 it applies to the wheel graph too. We first note that for all sets of vertices S, g N \S is connected; also, all sets of vertices are connected in g N . Therefore, if g N is c-stable w.r.t. (Y ce , v), then 22 Distance in a graph is defined as the shortest path between two vertices. 23 Note that it may be the case that i = k. In this case, however, we know that l 6 = j.
28
for all S ⊂ N:
Let now g be an arbitrary organization. Let also T be a connected set of vertices in g. By positive externalities and (25) we have:
This implies that T cannot improve upon g, and proves the result for g N .
Step 2. Let g be a non complete organization such that g 6 = g w . We construct the function v g ∈ V + to satisfy all c-stability constraints for g and in addition:
where T is a connected coalition in g such that g\T is not connected (see step 3.in proposition 6). By positive externalities we have
where g w is constructed in such a way that T is connected in g w (note that for each set of vertices T there exists some labelling of the set N under which T connected in g w ).
Inequalities (27) and (28) 
